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Abstract 
 
The size of the hidden economy stays an eternal unknown question. Economists 
specialized in this topic talk about a “passion for the unknown” as it is a phenomenon that we know 
exists but we cannot include it in our GDP since we do not know its exact size. The question of 
what the hidden economy consists of is also interesting, mainly due to its omnipresence.  
The aim of the project is to find out what influences the hidden economy, mainly in 
Denmark but also using examples from other countries. We naturally needed to define and explain 
what the hidden economy was and what it entailed before we talked about ways of measuring and 
estimating it, so that the reader knows what the hidden economy is and where the statistics and 
numbers about it come from.  
Analyzing documents about it and looking at statistics, we then find out what the 
hidden economy is about, its size and nature in Denmark and what influences it, i.e. policies that 
can decrease and prevent the hidden economy. As we go along, we include the sociological and 
political aspect of the hidden economy as it is affected by culture and politics.  
The project provides an overview of the hidden economy in Denmark, its causes and 
effects along with a range of policies that can influence it.  
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Introduction and our motivation for the study 
 
We broadly chose to write about the hidden economy. We did that because we are all interested in 
economics and so we wanted to choose a subject within that field. We got the idea to write about 
the hidden economy after reading a chapter about it in our economics book: “Foundations of 
Economics” by David Begg. The chapter was very short and didn‟t explain much apart from saying 
that there are many different theories you can use to explain this unknown phenomenon.   
In this project we are using the hidden economy as a phrase which includes all “hidden” activities – 
in short everything that is not counted in the official economy. As it is “hidden” there is no final 
answer to “what is the exact size of these hidden activities”. There are different methods of 
measuring it though. We will look into some of these methods and explain their reliability.     
To narrow the project we will use Denmark as an area of investigation. We have chosen Denmark 
because it‟s possible for all of us to read Danish so gathering knowledge and statistics will be easy. 
Moreover Denmark has a research unit called “The Rockwool Foundation” which provides statistics 
on the subject. In fact “The Rockwool Foundation” has provided some of the broadest 
investigations in the world – they have questioned many thousands of people about their relation 
with the hidden economy and from their answers they have made publications – mostly in Danish.  
We will use The Rockwool Foundation, among others, to explain what can create HE and therefore 
why the size of the HE in Denmark is the size it is.  
We do not only focus on Denmark though. We will look at ideas for policies that can be used to 
lower the HE and look at concrete examples of policies that have been taken into action in other 
western countries.  
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Problem formulation
 
Why is the hidden economy the size that it is in Denmark and what could be done to influence it? 
 
Research questions 
 How is the HE defined? 
 How is the HE measured? 
 What factors can create HE? 
 How is the HE in Denmark? 
 What are the effects of the HE?    
 What policies can be put into action to decrease HE? 
 What has been done in other countries against the HE? 
 
Methods 
We will use an inductive approach in our project, as we don‟t have any pre-made hypothesis. We 
will try to make our own theory by collecting data (estimation from past years in different countries 
- particularly Denmark). We will analyze documents about the HE, which will help us define and 
understand it. Then we will analyze those data and be able to make a theory and then draw a 
conclusion. Although we keep in mind that the inductive approach is more the tendency in which 
the project will be worked with rather than a fixed thing. 
 
We will use a lot of quantitative data (numbers, statistics, percentages, etc). The analysis of those 
data will be qualitative.
 
We have chosen to use mainly quantitative data, because we want to look at the HE mainly through 
an economist‟ point of view. This means that we want to deal with facts and numbers to avoid bias 
and subjective conclusion (although we keep in mind that statistics also can be bias; e.g. in the way 
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it is shown and in the way you ask questions in a questionnaire survey). However we will also 
include sociology, in the form of social capital and some political aspects to give the project a 
broader perspective and make it interdisciplinary. Sociology because this can give us an idea of why 
some people pay taxes and some people does not pay taxes. Politics because all the economic 
policies the politicians put into action can all affect the HE. We will try to look at what has been 
done politically to lower it.   
 
The general “problem” about the HE and the collection of data for our project, is that there are no 
100 % fully reliable sources. You can make estimations about the HE, and some estimations might 
clearly be better than others, but there are is final answer (not like usual economy) 
 
Ontology and epistemology 
Our ontological stance in this project will predominantly be objectivism (the positivist tradition). 
We choose objectivism because we believe that economy is very objective, mostly based on 
numbers and statistics (quantitative data) that can show what reality is. You can argue that the HE is 
a phenomenon created by and in constant change because of elements like social capital which then 
would change our stance to constructionism. However, as we have stated before we will look at the 
project mainly through an economist‟ point of view.
We have chosen the positivist epistemological stance. Both because the positivist- and the 
objectivist‟ stance are linked closely together but also because of all the subjects of social sciences, 
economy is the one that resembles most natural science and that uses natural sciences methods to 
generate theories or simply "general laws". As Bryman
1
 defines positivism for those who have an 
inductive approach (like we do): “Knowledge is arrived at through the gathering of facts that 
provide the basis for laws”.  
 
                                                          
1
 Bryman, Alan. 2008: “Social Research Methods” 
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Theory 
 
Laffer curve 
 The Laffer curve is an economic theory about the relation between the (marginal) tax rate and the 
tax revenue. The idea is that by raising the tax rate to a certain level you will reach equilibrium – 
hereafter you will get less revenue by raising taxes. This is due to that the incitement of paying 
taxes falls as the tax rises. You are more willing to cheat with the taxes if they are high and 
therefore the government ends up gaining less revenue. “An increase of the marginal tax rate leads 
to a decrease of tax revenue when the tax rate is too high
2”. Moreover there is the work/leisure 
balance that needs to be taken into account. You might want to spend more time on leisure if you 
feel you don‟t get that much from the last coin earned (marginal tax rate).  
  Visually the Laffer curve has the form of a parable – there can be some small adjustments. You 
can argue (as an example) that by raising tax to 100 % you‟ll get 0 % because no one will pay taxes. 
You can also argue that a small amount of people will pay gaining revenue of 5-10 %.  
 The most important when drawing the Laffer curve is not putting numbers at the axis as there is no 
evidence when equilibrium will strike (and it would also vary from country to country).  
 This homemade Laffer curve represents the general idea of how the curve looks like:  
 
 
                                                          
 
2
 F. Schneider 2002, “Shadow Economy” 
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Social Capital 
 
Social Capital is often being used in terms of building up a career, where the individual is using its 
contacts in order to reach its goals and make succeed. In this part we want to bring attention to 
Social Capital performed in the hidden economy.  
The hidden economy is benefitting from Social Capital since it creates jobs opportunities due to the 
fact that people are doing lots of interaction and networking. It is also important to state that 
creating jobs in the hidden economy is easier than making “real” jobs. A normal job costs more a 
piece than a job in the shadow economy sector. First of all the hidden economy does not pay taxes, 
and rules regarding, for example, the working environment do not get checked by the authorities 
like in the “real” market. The people in charge of these illegal companies are therefore able to keep 
costs lower than their competitors (legal companies). That in fact is a part of keeping the whole 
society on the track (although irregular activities can sometimes have higher cost or similar cost 
than the official one, due to the risk of being taken, the lack of security and insurance, etc). 
“I'll do this for you now, in the expectation that down the road you or someone else will return the 
favour ... a society that relies on generalized reciprocity is more efficient than a distrustful society” 
3
. Many of these situations could be interpreted as part of the hidden economy especially when it is 
regarding the labor market. It is a normal human characteristic to help each other, one can call it 
friendship, solidarity, and other could call it corruption if it takes place within a company sector. 
Bottom line is that it will always exist and it should always exist but should have some limit like 
everything else. One eternal question that people always wonder about, in the topic of the hidden 
economy (or more precisely the informal economy), is where the boundaries are, where the limit is 
between helping a friend fixing his car and irregular activity. Is it decided by the value of the 
service performed or more the nature of the service performed? That limit is fixed by cultural norms 
and even individual norms. 
The players in the whole hidden economy system have the same kind of opportunities as the formal 
workers when it comes to building up relations across cities and countries. “... Youth living in 
neighbourhoods blessed with high levels of civic engagement are more likely to finish school, have 
a job, and avoid drugs and crime ... That is, of two identical youths, the one unfortunate enough to 
live in a neighbourhood whose social capital has eroded is more likely to end up hooked, booked, or 
dead” 4. This argues that the social aspect has a huge role when it comes to where and how a child is 
                                                          
3
 Putnam, R. D. (1993). The prosperous community. The American Prospect, 4(13), 35–42 
4
 Ibid 
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being raised. It is of big importance and the child is adapting to the norms and rules wherever it is 
being raised. The social capital of a person, of a young boy for example will set his norms and make 
him the judge of what is acceptable or not. One of the norms and a big factor influencing the hidden 
economy in any country is tax morality. 
 The internet, phones and different social Medias are also available for people who commit crime 
(including white-collar crime). It is therefore easy for them to get access to different relevant types 
of news for them; an example could be text messages chains when the police are on the track of 
something big. Education and innovation are two important factors that make a criminal business 
stay in the market. It is of big importance for the groups to always be a step in front of the police 
and other authorities that are trying to bring them to justice. Phones and internet used in the right 
way can be a good tool for the industry. It is a major disadvantage since the police might be 
following people that can lead them to more and bigger criminals. Trade and cooperation has of 
course also benefitted from the technology. Another aspect of the influence of the new social capital 
available for the individual (e.g. internet) is the self-education. Nowadays, on the internet, one can 
learn how to brew its own alcohol, fix his car, buy cheaper products or copies of the real products 
on internet. That way internet is also another opportunity to cheat, consume products from hidden 
activities and find buyers or sellers more easily. 
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How is the Hidden Economy defined? (What are its different aspects? What is it?) 
 
If the hidden economy should be defined very simply, one could say it is the part of the 
economy that is unrecorded, unseen, evades taxes, illegal. If we have to define it, we need to 
separate it into its different aspects. It is simply because the hidden economy includes too many, 
very different activities that therefore makes it impossible to put in only one box.  
 
In our project, we chose to call it the hidden economy and by that we mean all the different 
aspects, everything that is hidden, unofficial. The hidden economy has been called many other 
names such as clandestine, black, subterranean, unrecorded, unmeasured, criminal, second, parallel, 
unobserved, shadow, underground, informal, submerged
5
 and many more adjectives. All those 
adjectives reflect the complexity of the phenomenon. They refer to the economy but can also refer 
to the type of market or employment. There are also great deals of disagreements about the extent of 
the hidden economy, disagreements that start at the very definition of what is included in the actual 
economy
6
 as a whole. 
 
We will understand the different aspects of the HE as B. Dallago did in his book. According 
to him there are four different types of economies (three different types of HE's), the regular, 
irregular, informal and criminal economy. The regular is then, the official one, the one that is 
recorded, in accordance with the rules. The other types are the three different types of HE's
7
.  
 
In his book, the author focuses on the irregular economy which, according to him, is defined 
as thus; the irregular economy refers to the deliberate attempt to evade or avoid the rules. 
Infractions of rules, laws, contracts, regulations that are by nature administrative, fiscal, sometimes 
social or cultural (society norms/code of conduct, traditions). Although the purpose is still to 
                                                          
                 
5
  Dallago, Bruno. The Irregular Economy: the "underground" Economy and the "black" Labour Market. Aldershot, Hants, England: 
Dartmouth, 1990. p.XV. Print. 
 
6
 We use many different terms for the hidden and official economy. Official = regular=actual, hidden = shadow. Other 
terms are explained in the section about “How is the hidden economy defined”. 
7
 Ibid p.9 
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achieve a goal that is permitted, tolerated or simply not condemned by the economic system 
concerned. Examples of irregular activities can be tax evasion, irregular self-employment, use of 
irregular capital, counterfeiting and many more. The input is illegal but the output is legal
8
. 
 
The informal economy refers to the irregular activities for self-consumption or for/between 
family, friends, relatives, acquaintances (baby-sitting, giving eggs to your neighbor, helping your 
friend moving from his place to another, lending your brother in law your trailer, etc. It also 
includes volunteer work. The input and output are legal. (Other authors have excluded household 
consumption from the informal economy, we choose to leave it like this since it is a category which 
includes all legal activities).  
 
The criminal economy refers to the activities that are illegal such as car thefts, drugs or 
human trafficking, mugging, etc. Both the input and output are illegal.  
 
One can then study the interactions between the different economies, how does an activity 
go from regular to irregular or the opposite way? How does something go from criminal to 
informal? And most importantly, which factors create these changes. An activity can change from 
an economy to another for different reasons; price level (e.g. becomes cheaper to do it yourself), 
legislation (a product or service becomes illegal or legal), culture (in one country, one thing might 
be seen as corruption and irregular labor while in another one it will be seen as helping out a friend 
or solidarity), trade unions (make sure employers respect the collective agreements on certain rules 
such as minimum salaries, safety, maximum working hours, which can lead an employer to 
employing irregular labor), tax levels (taxes are too high, some people find it more profitable to 
work unofficially, find ways of evading taxes). 
 
The researchers working with the hidden economy often mention that the study of the HE is 
the passion for knowing the unknown. Indeed the HE is very controversial among authors for lot of 
reasons, one of those reasons is how reliable certain methods of estimation are, and more generally, 
is it possible to measure the HE at all. There is a major issue of accuracy in this subject because the 
                                                          
8
 Ibid p.3-6 
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phenomenon that is the HE is so complex and depends on so many factors that it is difficult to know 
the extent of it, but also its impact on the official economy and what exactly its causes are.  
 
What are the different methods for measuring the size of the hidden economy and 
how reliable are they? 
 
We will now account and discuss the most common methods, without going to details, 
mainly to give the reader a good overview on what HE statistics are based on, what factors are 
taken into account, what tools are at the economists disposal to do their estimation and how 
uncertain the results can be (depending on the methods and desired result). 
 
There are methods using direct approaches (direct methods), which are ”...micro-economic 
approaches, employing either well-designed surveys or samples based on voluntary replies, or tax 
auditing and other compliance methods.”9 The result depends a lot on the cooperation of the 
individuals questioned but also how the surveys have been formulated. They usually provide a good 
overview of the structure of the shadow economy rather than the extent of e.g. illicit work.
10
 The 
other direct method is to measure the difference between the income declared to taxes and the actual 
income discovered via different audits.
11
 
 
The indirect approaches are mostly macroeconomic and use different factors to estimate to 
size of the HE. According to the book ”The Shadow Economy, An International Survey” by 
Schneider and Enste from 2002, there are 5 different indirect approaches.  
 
                                                          
9 Schneider, Friedrich, and Dominik Enste. The Shadow Economy: an International Survey. Cambridge UP, 2002. p.15. Print. 
10 Ibid 
11 Schneider, Friedrich, and Dominik Enste. The Shadow Economy: an International Survey. Cambridge UP, 2002. p15-16. Print. 
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The first is to calculate the difference between the national income and national expenditure. 
Although the expenditure-side components are not measured without errors, there are omissions and 
errors in national accounting, therefore the discrepancies cannot reflect the size of the HE alone
12
. 
 
The second is analyzing the difference between the official and the actual labor force. 
Although people can have a regular part-time job and have another irregular job on the side. 
Moreover, one cannot conclude that, because the size of the actual labor is decreasing, the size of 
irregular labor is increasing, given that the HE is certainly not the only cause
13
.  
 
The third is based on the conclusion that if the cash demand rises above its normal or 
absolute value, the HE has increased (given that transactions in the HE are mostly in cash in order 
to leave no traces).  This method is subdivided in three methods that deviate from each other but are 
all based on the same idea
14
.  
 
The physical input (also called the electricity consumption) method is based on the 
assumption that the national economy grows along with the national electricity consumption. From 
there, one can deduct that if, for example, the national electricity consumption rises significantly 
more than the official economy; it means that the size of the HE is increasing
15
.  
 
The model approach is an approach/method that is much more complicated in the way that, 
unlike the precedent methods, it takes into account several causes and several indicators in the hope 
to capture more of the complexity of the phenomenon that is the HE. The DYMIMIC and MIMIC 
methods, often used in estimations of the HE, are based on this approach. For this method, a 
complex statistical calculation is used. It is called the statistical theory of unobserved variables. In 
our attempt to explain this method without going to much into details of the calculations we will say 
that it is about taking, in this case, the four different causes (tax burden, regulation density, tax 
moral, income) and “regress” them into one “latent variable” (take all the numbers and make it into 
one). The same is done with the indicators (which are income rate, working hours and the GNP), the 
                                                          
12 Ibid p.16-17 
13  Ibid p.17 
14  Ibid 
15  Ibid p.22-24 
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percentage of the country‟s hidden economy is found by the help of the e.g. currency demand 
method, which then allows the economist to find a coefficient or index to transform the currency 
demand method‟s result into a more accurate result of the percentage of the HE in the given 
country
16
.   
 
The position of the Hidden Economy in the actual economy 
 
Total leakages and total injections 
Going from the fact that total leakages and total injections have to be equal, we think we could 
incorporate the HE (if it is not incorporated in the circular flow of money, it is a leakage and 
injection). “Leakages always equal injections by definition.”17 
Total leakages = Savings + [Taxes-Benefits] + Import 
Total injections = Investment + Government spending + Export 
 
Now if we want to incorporate the HE in the total leakages we could have: 
Total leakages=Savings + [Taxes-Benefits] + Import + HE consumption 
HE consumption is the part of the income that is consumed in one or several goods or services that 
are part of the hidden economy that are therefore a leakage from the circular flow between 
households and firms. Hidden activities also sometimes include activities that are part of the firms 
and households circular flow, therefore it is impossible to say “all hidden activities can be seen as 
leakages and injections” since they entail too many different kinds of activities. However this can 
give an idea of how certain hidden activities can be positioned in the actual economy.  
Since total injections have to be equal, there is a need for a factor giving higher injections, this 
could be written as the following:  
Total injections = Investment + Government spending + Export + HE revenue 
                                                          
16
   Ibid p24-26 
17
 Begg, David. Foundations of Economics. McGraw-Hill Education, 2006. p.177 Print. 
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The HE revenue would be an injection in the circular flow between households and firms since the 
revenue has been made outside the circular flow but can be injected in that flow again.  
Further thinking leads us to think the result of [taxes-benefits] will be higher since the hidden 
economy also includes evading taxes and cheating benefits.  This higher number will result in 
higher HE revenue. 
 
The other way, the one that seems the most appropriate, is to add the HE into the circular flow 
between firms and households.  
 
Figure 2 – the circular flow between households and firms  
 
 
 
This is the classic model of the circular flow between firms and households.  
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What we want to do is to incorporate hidden activities. This is how we think hidden activities fit in 
the model:  
 
 
Figure 3 – the circular flow including hidden activities  
 
The partial line shows the possibility, the way hidden activities could fit in this model. According to 
this model, hidden activities also provide goods and services for the households, the households 
provide labor for the hidden activities but also consume the goods and services provided by hidden 
activities. The hidden activities therefore also provide income for the households. By hidden 
activities we mean economic hidden activities, activities described in the first section (criminal, 
irregular, informal). 
This model is a very simple way of showing what position hidden activities can have in the 
macroeconomic system but as we have seen so far, the hidden economy is a concept that is so 
complex that it is never simple like this. The hidden economy entails so many different kinds of 
19 
 
activities that they cannot be put into one box. The hidden economy or activities do not have one 
specific definition like firms or households, hidden activities can be seen anywhere, within the firms 
or the households. The hidden economy can also use firms or households to get regular goods and 
services or “white washing” money, also called money laundering which is about disguising money 
obtained illegally in the regular market (fake companies, casinos…). Therefore, if we were to count 
the hidden economy in the GDP, there would be a considerable risk of double counting and 
overestimating its percentage. 
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Hidden Economy in Denmark 
 
 In this chapter, we will write generally about HE in Denmark and how it has changed over the 
years. How much unofficial work is being done and who does it.  
 The chapter is based on figures found in the Danish book: “Danskerne og det sorte arbejde” by the 
Rockwool Foundation
18
. 
 
How much work is being done in the unofficial sector?  
 This following graph, made by the Rockwool Foundation, shows how many people in the age 
group 18-74 have worked unofficially. 
 
Figure 4 
 
 As seen on the graph, there was around 25 % of the 18-74 year old in Denmark who had worked 
unofficially in 1994. The amount of people was the same the following six years after which it fell 
to around 15 % in 2009. This is actually a fall of 40 % in just nine years time.  
                                                          
18
 2010, writers: Camilla Hvidtfeldt, Bent Jensen, Claus Larsen 
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However as the next graph shows, those active on the unofficial labor market have been working 
more during the same years (it shows the average hours spent per week for those active on the 
irregular labor market). 
Figure 5 
 
Who does unofficial work? 
 We will first look at statistics stating the demographic conditions for those who have worked 
unofficially. This following diagram shows the sex, age group, region and population density
19
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 To explain: the diagrams show the percentage of people who have worked illegally based on sex (women: pink, 
men: blue),  age group, region (Copenhagen and its surroundings: dark green,  Zealand and Funen: green, Jutland: 
pink) and population density (metropolis: 24 %, Province: 33 %, countryside: 43 %) – compared to the total percentage 
of the different groups (e.g. women/men 50 % each).  
22 
 
Figure 6 
 
 
We can conclude that there are more men than women who work unofficially. There are less old 
than younger people who have done unofficial work. People in Jutland perform more irregular jobs 
than people in Copenhagen and the rest of Denmark. And according to this diagram the more 
populated the area, the lesser the percentage of people performing unofficial work. 
 In the following diagram we will look at how many years (and within what area) of education 
people who have worked unofficially
20
.  
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 To explain: Education (first range of columns): primary school (green), high school (white), vocational (yellow), 
degree of higher education (short, middle, long) – branch of study (second range of columns): not vocational (dark 
blue), pedagogic-humanistic (dark green), production-transport-craftsmanship (green), society-trade (pink), natural 
sciences-health (blue). The black line on the top of each column represents the interval of uncertainty.  
23 
 
Figure 7 
 
 
As seen in the diagram, it is around mid-twenty; no matter the length of the education 
one has (fits well with the fact that “24 % of the Danish population has done some undeclared 
work
21”). However, those with a longer education have a smaller percentage of performing 
unofficial work. With regards to branch of study; especially those who deal with production, 
transport and craftsmanship have a high percentage (almost 35 %) of people that have worked 
unofficial. Those who have studied science, health, trade and social sciences have a lower 
percentage of the population (around 14-17 %) that has worked unofficially.  
 
To sum up: In the past two decades there are less people who have worked unofficial. However, 
those who have did work longer.  
The typical person that has done unofficial work is a man, young (18 to 29 years old), live on the 
countryside in Jutland and have an education in craftsmanship (that is not long).  
                                                          
21
 Annual report 2010 for the Rockwool Foundation. Can be found at: http://www.en.rff.dk/files/RFF-
site/Publikations%20upload/%C3%85rsrapporter/Aarsrapport_2010_rockwoolfonden.pdf 
Quote at page 10 
24 
 
 The typical person that has not done unofficial work is a woman, (60-74 years old), live in the city 
of Copenhagen and have a long education in Biology.  
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What factors can influence the Hidden Economy 
 
We have earlier looked upon what HE is and how it is measured. We will in this chapter describe 
which factors within a country can influence/develop the HE. As HE is very complex and large, we 
write can. A factor provoking at high HE in one country might not have a similar effect on the HE 
in another country.  
We will now list the different factors we have come across that can generate HE. We will use a 
bullet point form to present the different factors: 
 The fiscal or - the tax burden in a country. Most scientists we have come across dealing with 
HE agree that the fiscal burden in a country can play a big role when it comes to the size of 
the HE
22
. This only applies to the western world however and there are exceptions of this 
such as Italy or Spain with lower tax burdens compared to many other western countries but 
still maintain a higher HE. We therefore think it is more correct to think that, if people feel 
that their interests are maintained through the fiscal burden – i.e. do they have the feeling 
they get something from their money (see institutional quality and „voice‟ option). 
The reason why a high fiscal burden can create high HE is that a high tax level raises the 
incentive of evading taxes because some people will think it is too much. Moreover there is 
the risk that a high tax level can create poverty traps for some people. A poverty trap “means 
that getting a job makes a person worse off than staying at home
23”. An example of this 
could be that you have a job where you get paid only a little more (after paying taxes) than 
you would be paid with grants from the state. In this case it can be better to stay at home as 
working also costs money (transport, clothes etc.) and in addition you get much more leisure 
time which you can spend on taking care of your children or even do working for friends 
and family; hereby contributing to the HE.  
This (that a high tax level raises the HE) can turn into a negative spiral. When less people 
contribute to the State but society wants to uphold the current amount of welfare benefits; 
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the government is forced to raise the taxes – which again will create more HE. This, of 
course, depends on how close you are to reach equilibrium (how close you are to reach a 
point where you get less State revenue by raising taxes. (cf. Laffer curve in the theory 
section for an illustration of this phenomenon.  
 Unemployment: The unemployed (especially the voluntary unemployed (see above) have 
the time and a reason (earning some money to feed family) to do illegal/unofficial activities.  
 The retirement age. The earlier people retire, the more energy they will have, ceteris paribus, 
to do things that contribute to the HE. Imagine a retired carpenter. If he has the energy after 
retirement, he certainly has the time to do work for friends, family – even for people he does 
not know. And now that he is retired, he can choose how much and when he wants to work.   
Another aspect of this is that we live longer
24
 and people might be forced to do some work 
(if they have the energy) if their pension are not big enough.  
 However – as we looked upon in the section about HE in Denmark – it is mainly the young 
and not old people who have worked unofficially. Therefore we do not think the retirement 
age is a factor of very high importance.  
 The number of working hours: If people are busy working they do not have time (or 
hopefully the need) to do illegal/unofficial activities. Some countries have tried to reduce the 
number of working hours (France for example) in order spread out the work to more 
people
25
. This, of course, requires that there are enough people who are qualified to take on 
the new jobs.   
 Criminal activities such as drug dealing. When people grow cannabis for example and sell it 
on the irregular market (criminal organizations or just individuals) who then, for example, 
whitewash the money or/and use it to finance other criminal activities; it is part of the HE. 
One could argue though, that these kinds of activities also contribute to the actual economy 
the money made by this criminal sector has to be spent on the actual economy at some point 
and therefore, should somehow contribute to the GNP. In his leisure time, a man who has a 
9-17 job but also has a small field of cannabis he harvests and sells to a group of gang 
members who then sell it on and then whitewash the money for 80 % of what it is worth has 
generated more GNP than he would if he only had the 9-17 job.  
 Institutional quality. How successful does the government maintain the citizens‟ interests 
and therefore: how do the citizens look at the government. Included in this part can be how 
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effective and consequent the government is at applying its laws, how good the rule of law 
works, how much corruption there is etc.  
 Rules and regulations. How “dense” the jungle of regulations in a country is. This is one of 
the most significant factors that can lead to unofficial activities as Schneider and Enste 
explains
26
. By density of regulations they mean all the administrative rules there are; for 
companies but also for single persons. Rules that can both be of economic character (e.g. in 
Denmark you must pay a small sum of money to create a company) but also be more of 
bureaucratic character (e.g. it can sometimes be hard to know how tax is measured and how 
you should declare it) which can lead to an attitude where you give up and fail to declare all 
your earnings. Schneider and Enste point out that the density of regulations raises as the 
service sector become larger.  
 Therefore we think it is possible that the western world with traditionally large tertiary 
sectors has an especially high density of regulations.   
 Punishment for not paying taxes. In countries where the punishment for evading taxes is 
high, the HE is generally lower. Many Asian countries have a high expected punishment – 
Singapore is an example of this
27
.  
 Tax morale. How keen the citizens in a country are on paying their taxes. According to 
B.Torgler and F. Schneider
28
, “the tax morale plays a significant role in determining the 
level of the shadow economy” in fact: “higher tax morale and a higher institutional quality 
lead to a smaller shadow economy”. There are many factors that play in when measuring 
morale and there are scientists that say that the subject is therefore too complex to include
29
.  
However, when talking about factors that can influence the tax morale, one could talk about 
social capital (see the chapter of social capital in the theory section) in the sense of how 
loyal taxpayers are towards the government – and maybe more importantly to their fellow 
citizens. Moreover (as we have written about in the fiscal section) the compliance to pay 
taxes also raises if the taxpayers feel they get something from the money they have to pay 
taxes on (cf. two pillars strategy, „voice‟ option).  
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What creates Hidden Economy in Denmark 
 
We will use this chapter in order to understand what contributes in the prosperity of the HE in 
Denmark by comparing all the previously mentioned factors with Danish standards.  
The first noticeable thing about Danish conditions is the Scandinavian idea of a welfare state. It 
means a major fiscal burden as the government becomes the main caretaker of each individual; 
meaning that the Danish state provides free healthcare, school (you even get money for studying
30
), 
takes care of the poorest in society (redistribution of wealth) among other things – all with the point 
of ensuring equality in access.  
This is mainly done by a progressive tax system which means a person pays more as his/her gross 
income increases. This is known as the marginal tax rate. And Denmark has had a relatively large 
marginal tax rate - However, as this chart shows, the marginal tax rate in Denmark has actually 
decreased during the last 16 years
31
 (the numbers is % of income).  
Table 1 
% 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Low 47,5 47,1 45,2 45,2 43,7 42,9 42,9 42,6 40,9 
Middle
32
 56,5 51,7 50,7 50,7 49,2 49,2 49,2 49,2  
High 67,4 66,4 65,3 63,9 63,0 63,0 63,0 63,0 56,1 
 
 
Another interesting aspect when dealing with taxes is the total tax burden. The total tax burden 
counts for all the taxes set by the government
33
. We have made a chart using the same years as 
before
34
. The numbers we have taken are % of GDP. Note that there is a difference from the chart 
about the marginal tax rate where we used statistics that were based on income. The reason for this 
is what kind of data we have succeeded in gathering and what we want to show. What we want to 
show is if there has been a difference in the factors that can create HE over the years: 
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Table 2 
 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
% 49,0 49,4 49,5 49,5 48,0 49,2 49,8 48,2 48,1 
 
As seen the total tax burden is lower today than it was in 1994. In 2005 it reached 51 and since then 
it has gradually fallen.  
So when looking at just the marginal tax rate and the total tax burden you can say that they have 
both decreased in the past 16 years. The marginal tax rate has decreased significantly whereas the 
total tax burden has been more stagnant. 
 
Unemployment 
As we stated in the previous chapter, unemployment can lead to an increase of the HE because 
people now have the time to do some extra work. Some might even be forced to do it to provide 
their family. We have made this chart for an overview of unemployment
35
. We have used the same 
years as previously. 
Table 3 
 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
% 7,7 6,3 4,9 4,3 4,6 5,5 3,9 3,3 7,4 
 
From the chart we can see that Denmark had an unemployment rate of 7, 7 % in 1994. During the 
next 14 years it fell down to 3, 3 % - it only rose in the period from 2000-2004. From 2008 to 2010 
it raised by 4, 1 % -mainly because of the financial crisis.  
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The retirement age 
When focusing on the retirement age, we will focus on the average retirement age (using the same 
years as before). This will give us an idea of whether people retire earlier or later now than they did 
16 years ago – in other words: do they have more time for unofficial activities36: 
Table 4 
 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2009
37
 
years 62,4 62,7 62,7 63,4 62,4 63,4 63,9 63,5 64,4 
 
As it is seen in the chart the average retirement age has increased over the last 15 years. In fact, the 
average age of retirement was 2 years older than in 1994. This also copes well with the politicians‟ 
wish of people staying longer on the labor market as that will mean higher tax revenues to the 
government.  
 
Number of working hours 
The typical workweek for a Dane is Monday to Friday, 37 hours per week. However, Eurostats 
have made some statistics showing the average number of working hours per week (full time 
employment). We will list them in a chart – though it has not been possible to find statistics for 
before 1997
38
.  
Table 5 
 1997 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 
hours 39,9 40,1 40,6 40,3 40,3 40,4 40,2 
 
The number of working hours has risen slightly since 1997. However it has also fallen a bit since 
2000. We can conclude that it has been pretty stable over the years, not differing much from the 
point of origin.  
                                                          
36
 Statistics found from OECD’s homepage: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/47/0,3343,en_2649_34747_39371887_1_1_1_1,00.html 
37
 It hasn’t been possible to find statistics for the average retirement age in 2010 
38
 Statistics is from Eurostat’s homepage: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00071&plugin=0 
31 
 
 
Criminal activities 
There are no statistics stating how much work is being done in the criminal sector in Denmark. We 
will therefore not go into dept with this subject.  
 
Institutional quality 
We will use the Worldbank‟s measurement‟s over three different factors: Government 
effectiveness, rule of law and control of corruption
39
.  
They come in percentile – meaning that they get a percentage rating and ranging from 0-100 – 
dependant on how many countries worldwide which are worse off. A 0 therefore means the worst 
case scenario on earth, while 100 means the best.  
Table 6 
percentile 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 
Effectiveness 97,1 95,6 95,6 99,5 100 100 99,5 
Rule of law 97,6 98,1 97,1 98,1 99 98,1 99,5 
corruption 100 99,5 99 99,5 99,5 99,5 100 
 
As seen in the chart government effectiveness fell from 1996 to 2000. Hereafter it rose and now it‟s 
one of the most successful in the world, scoring 100 and 99,5. 
Rule of law also claims a very high score. It is stagnant on a percentile around 98 for the whole 
period (exceptions are 2004 and 2008 where it was 99 and 99,5). 
In avoiding corruption, Denmark is one of the leading countries, scoring not less than 99 during the 
whole period. 
Comparing all three factors one could say that they are first and foremost very high, which is 
illustrating a very successful government. Secondly they have all been slightly rising (even though 
there has not been much room for improvement) which should mean even better government 
control, which again should equal a lower HE. 
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Density of rules and regulations 
We have been able to find some statistics that go from 1960 to 1990, where the density of rules and 
regulations of different OECD countries is calculated. The main conclusion from the chart is that 
Denmark has a fairly high density (in 1990 it was the second highest after Sweden)
40
. As the table 
uses statistics that are too old, we cannot use them directly to compare with our other findings; 
though we can conclude that the traditionally high amount of density can be a contributing factor to 
the HE in Denmark.  
 
Tax morale 
As for the density of rules and regulations, we have not been able to find statistics about tax morale 
using the same years as previously. Though, we have been able to find out that, according to 
statistics from B. Torgler (who is one of the leading scientists working with tax morale), Denmark 
had a high tax morale in 1990-1993, but from 1999-2001 Denmark had the highest tax morale in 
Western Europe
41
. This can be playing a major role to lower the HE in Denmark.  
 
Punishment for not paying taxes  
There are a lot of laws regarding to “paying taxes” – too many to mention every law and 
punishment here. Instead, we will conclude that comparing the punishment for cheating with taxes 
with other sorts of crimes, the punishment for cheating with taxes is quite high. You can be forced 
to jail for up to half a year if you cheat with smaller sums of money; and you can go to jail up to 8 
years if you cheat for more than 500.000DKK
42
. 
Though, it seems that Denmark is going against more liberal conditions as the Danish minister of 
Taxes have just presented a new proposal where it will be legal to make more home services
43
 - 
after realizing that many people have done it even though it is illegal.  
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 The general picture  
 The general picture we get by looking at the different measurements of the conditions in Denmark, 
throughout the years, is positive in the sense that almost all the factors we have looked at (that can 
encourage the HE) seem to go in the right way: towards lower HE. This also copes well with 
tendency we see in figure 3 where we can see a significant decrease in the population who has 
worked unofficially.  
However, we have found these two charts – both using the currency demand method – each with 
different viewpoints of how the HE is coming along in Denmark. They show how much the HE is 
of GDP. 
Table 7 
 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 
HE
44
  14,5 15,3 15,3 16,1 16,2 16,5 
HE
45
 17,8  18,3 18,0 17,9 17,1 15,4 
 
According to the first calculations the hidden economy in Denmark has been raising since 1996 
with 2 % of GDP.  
According to the second calculations the hidden economy in Denmark has been decreasing since 
1994 with 2,4 % of GDP. It is especially noticeable from 2004 to 2006 where the first calculation 
says that it has raised from 16,2% to 16,5%, whereas the other calculation says it has been 
decreasing from 17,1% to 15,4% of GDP.  
This just shows the complexity of the subject and even though there are signs that the HE in 
Denmark has been decreasing over the last two decades, there are too many factors that play in to 
make a final conclusion (proved by numbers and facts) of the size of the HE.  
However, as mentioned before, Denmark has good conditions to prevent HE such as a high tax 
morality (which shows that people feel they get something from the fiscal burden) and a very high 
institutional quality. So if we were to say why the HE is the size that it is in Denmark and not lower 
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than other OECD countries (see appendix for a diagrams showing the HE in different OECD 
countries) we would say it is because of the high fiscal burden (even though the majority of people 
in Denmark seem to recognize it) and the high density of regulations.   
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The allocation effect 
 
The allocation effect on production and growth are both positive and negative. Hidden 
Economy has always been combined with a waste of resources in society. First of all, the society 
has to suspect and investigate a case of hidden economy. Gathering information is very costly 
because the people have done everything in their power to hide things and most of the time, the 
suspect does not help the investigation letting the authorities know what is going on. The state also 
has expenses on the ascertainment and the prosecution
46
. 
Figure 8 – Allocation effect 
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Changes in the tax moral, income, regulation density and tax burden can all be reasons for 
the hidden economy raising or decreasing – first of all making the system more dynamic and harder 
to cheat on will increase the competiveness since money from the “unofficial” economy goes to the 
official economy. Side effects of this would be the state saving money on hunting criminals, more 
space in the prisons. There will be paid taxes of the official economy which means that the state 
now will make a profit of the activities. The taxes coming in will make the society better and the 
state might even be able to lower some taxation to get larger revenue when the hidden economy 
activities become official
47
.  
The higher employment in the “unofficial” economy has on the other hand a bad influence 
on the whole society, since money are not registered anywhere, and taxes are not being paid. There 
are less official jobs which is bad for the employment. The growth in general will be affected in a 
bad way when an unofficial economy is too big. The amount of capital and material assets will also 
go down, the same thing will happen with the potential of future production because unofficial 
business is able to compete at a much lower level. Regulations and nice offices are not the first 
priority since they have, in general, lower cost of producing goods. 
The positive effects from competition in an official economy are also in some way 
depending on a lower unofficial economy. An example that has been argued is that the hidden 
economy mainly focuses on cheating taxes, which means less money to the state and that result in a 
smaller amount of money invested in new technology such as environment friendly energy or 
cancer fighting research for example.  
The above example would be something the hidden economy would never put their focus on 
since the process would be very long and in the meantime there would be no profit, only cost. If 
they ever make a result, then the product should be available for the whole population and in this 
way the activities would be public.   
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What are the best policies/reforms/measures/interventions that can be put into 
action in order to decrease the national hidden economy? 
 
Schneider, in his book The Shadow Economy talks about the policies, the measures that have 
to be taken to decrease the HE in the long-run. He warns about state interventions and the disastrous 
consequences that it can have on the economy. Switzerland is often cited as an example of a country 
that have a low HE and therefore can be a good example on certain points.  
 
Schneider‟s policies are what is called in economical terms „supply-side‟ 
policies/measures/reforms. He presents the “two-pillar” strategy. It is called like this because of its 
two aspects. The two aspects of the policies framework, still according to Schneider, are the „voice‟ 
options and the „exit‟ options48.  
 
The „voice‟ options is about bringing the citizens closer to the state/government so that they 
can be active and therefore not feel like their freedom is being infringed by high taxes. Feel that 
they get something out of paying taxes
49
. 
 
The „exit‟ options are the options that one has if he is not satisfied with its current 
government or the national system in general, for example the balance between tax and services. 
The individual can change location (move to another state or region) or enter the shadow economy 
(not paying taxes, illicit work, criminal sector...). 
 
The idea is therefore to put policies in action that decrease the attractiveness of the exit 
options and strengthen the voice options
50
. The policies ideas presented by Schneider, in general, 
focus only on the shadow economy and therefore do not take into account the welfare state and its 
benefits nor the sociological aspect of the society. When discussing lowering taxes for example, he 
does not discuss what other consequences it might have or the other cost that it might imply for the 
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citizens (further insurance contributions, scholarships, etc, which, in the end, can result in the same 
disposable income and therefore not have such a big influence on the HE. Those two “families” of 
policies are policies which in theory, still according to Schneider, would decrease the HE. Nothing 
else is taken into account, the reader should be aware of that fact.  
 
Decreasing the attractiveness of the exit options involves putting into actions policies such 
as reducing taxes to increase the tax base (number of revenues being taxed); more people should be 
willing to move back into the regular economy if the taxes are lower. Other policies are reforms 
targeted to simplify the system, a need for more flexibility in general. Examples of policies are 
mentioned in the next sections about examples of policies. Other policies involve simplifying the 
tax laws because, if they are too complicated, it leads to the erosion of tax morality (people less 
willing to pay taxes) which undermines the tax base. The social security system needs to be 
reformed as well to reduce the burden of contribution payment
51
.  
 
Behavioral options
52
  
Voice options 
Elections 
Direct Democracy 
Citizen Initiatives 
Pressure Groups 
Mass Media 
Polls 
Expertise/ Commissions 
Expert Councils 
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Research Institutes 
Economic Policy Consulting 
 
Exit options 
Moving Location 
Pure Tax Evasion 
Shadow Economy:  
Illicit Work 
Informal Sector 
Household Sector 
Criminal Sector 
 
 
Strengthening the voice option involves making citizens feel closer to the state; give them 
the possibility to participate politically, to be heard. Direct democracy tools can be used, tools such 
as referenda
53
. The voice option can also be strengthen, using the elements mentioned above (under 
voice options). 
 
“The Reactance Theory suggests the following opportunities to reduce the resistance against 
the tax burden: on the one hand, credibly setting a time limit to the burden could avoid 
reactance and negative economic consequences due to migration into the shadow economy; 
on the other hand, if the infringement on personal freedom is perceived as legitimate it will 
not lead to reactance”54. 
 
                                                          
53
 Ibid 
           54 Enste, Dominik H. "The Shadow Economy and Institutional Change in Transition Countries." Brainguide.com. Web. 
<http://www.brainguide.com/data/publications/PDF/pub4429.pdf>. p22. 
40 
 
Centralization works against those policies. The EU demands harmonization (of prices, 
taxes, etc.). Taxpayers feel like they are not getting enough back from their taxes and that they pay 
for something they do not care about or understand. They feel a lack of control of their money. 
Therefore, a federal European Union is often discussed and could be a solution keep the people 
close to the state and simultaneously create inter-regional competition. Frey, a Swiss author, wants 
a “new federalism for Europe“. The objective is a combination of federalism and direct democracy. 
The features of his idea of federalism for the EU resembles a lot the federal system currently in 
place in Switzerland with their different “cantons” that are different geographical areas. The main 
features of his proposed new governmental units can be summarized by the term “Functional 
Overlapping Competing Jurisdictions (FOCJ)”, characterized by functional differences in size and 
geographic over-lapping, resulting in a competition of regions or systems. Individuals can state their 
preferences in referendums or citizen initiatives. These measures correspond to the subsidiarity 
principle because they enable people to control politicians and bring back power to levels at which a 
lot of problems can be solved”55.  
 
Subsidiarity is a concept that can be seen for two purposes, one is two bring the power 
closer to the citizens, for example bring from a national to a local level, i.e. decentralization. The 
purpose can also be seen (usually by anti-federalist and EU‟s skeptics) as a way to protect nations 
against supranational organizations like EU and the member states, bring back more power for the 
member states and let the EU deal with matters that cannot be dealt with on a national level
56
.  
 
Legalizing a part of illicit work is also one objective. It should be easier for immigrants to 
get a job, so that they are not obliged to enter the shadow economy. Giving a limited working 
permit is also a solution to avoid exploitation of the immigrants.  
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Examples of policies to prevent or decrease the HE 
 
In the past years, there have been more policies in Europe targeted against the hidden economy for 
three reasons
57
 :  
- A regularization of shadow labor and firms increases investment and competition.  
-The state wants to increase tax revenues 
-The HE hinders social cohesion (extra-economic reason) 
 
The different EU countries have very different ways of seeing things, they use different instruments 
and they target different groups or sectors. A great example of this is France and Germany who 
punish firms for employing irregular labor while Poland punishes the workers themselves. On the 
other hand, Denmark and Italy have, using different measures, were seeking to punish customers 
who are buying products made in the hidden economy.
58
    
According to this report from Colin Crouch, there are three “families” of policies; 
basically, preventing (type A), punishing (type B) and policies that encourage firms to emerge from 
the shadows (type C). We are going to look at each one of them and give examples for each of 
them
59
.  
Examples of preventing policies (policies of type A), can be the policies conducted by Sweden 
during the 90s trying to reinforce the link between individual contributions to the social security 
system and the benefits that were received (that way encouraging paying contribution and having a 
regular job). Germany, in 2002, realized the link between excessive regulation in the labor market 
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and the development of the hidden economy and therefore introduced measures such as temporary 
jobs limited for certain type of workers of firms
60
.   
Italy for example introduced legal working for pensioners, which is one of the main groups of the 
irregular labor market. Spain reduced taxation on low income and introduced new forms of flexible 
labor contracts.
61
 
Many policies of this kind, and in general targeted against the HE are indirect, the original targeting 
can be fighting unemployment, making the system more flexible, reducing cost of welfare benefits, 
etc. Lots of the indirect policies can be, for example, immigration policies because government find 
out the many immigrants are forced to engage into irregular activities since they do not possess the 
professional skills to find a decent jobs. It can also have something to do with culture differences, 
especially on tax moral.  
The policies of type B (punishments, sanctions, publicity campaigns) can be found in many 
countries. It can be publicity campaign against the HE (like the one targeted on young people in 
Sweden in the mid-90s). In France, there is a commission against illegal work and they cooperate 
with the police, taxation bodies, social security institutions and the social partners. There are also 
laws concerned solely on the HE like the German “black labor law” from 1947 but heavily 
reformed since the end of the 90s. It provides sanctions for firms employing irregular labor; the 
sanction can be, for example, exclusion from bidding on public contracts
62
.  
Policies of type C aim at encouraging firms to leave the shadow sector. Those policies seem to be 
about innovating instruments of action. An example is the vouchers (chèques) in France and 
Belgium which were introduced to simplify payment for domestic services since they make it 
possible for anyone to employ a domestic worker temporarily. The voucher is addressed to the 
worker directly or the firm
63
.  
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The German, still in the attempt to making their system more flexible, introduced what they call 
“mini-jobs”. Those are labor contracts of a maximum of 15 hours a week, specially designed and 
reserved for pensioners, students and married women
64
.  
Still in this same report, the authors mention the fact that there has been a rise in measures targeted 
on wage flexibility and external flexibility. The case of Italy is very interesting because it seems 
like they have taken a lot of measures against specifically the hidden economy. Among those, there 
is one in the mid-90s where, in the textile sector, the government allowed companies to pay their 
employees below the national collective agreements on the condition that the employer will 
gradually raise the wage until it reaches national average
65. In the end of the 90‟s, they reformed 
this method a little bit by decentralizing a bit and make sure the employers honored the agreements 
by using local social partners and regional task forces. “Tutors” were also employed by the Italian 
National Committee for the Emersion of Irregular Labor to advise companies who wanted to follow 
the path of legalization
66
.  
One of the most radical measures we have come across might be the following, where the 
government launched a campaign that allowed employers to wipe the slate clean of their illegal 
past. To encourage them, they are permitted a reduced tax rate and social contribution (during three 
years) so that they can adapt to the higher cost of legality (mainly labor cost). In return they also 
have to make a plan of “emersion”, to make their company 100% legal and regular. If they do not 
reach that goal in the agreed time limit they will become liable for paying the full tax rate and social 
contributions which they originally had a “discount” on67.  
The authors reflect on the efficiency of the latter mentioned policies and measures that have been 
tried in the different countries. They see three reasons why those measures are not as efficient as 
one might think
68
.  
-The first one is that most of those measures are focused on individual firms or even 
individual workers so they do not affect the whole system of governance which the firms or workers 
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are embedded on and therefore do not create conditions to change the whole system and the way the 
actors think
69
.  
-The second problem is the temporary aspect of those policies. The shadow economy 
needs long-term policies and stability in those policies to emerge whereas the policies change in the 
degree of punishment, in its extent, in its targeting
70
. It might be due to a change in the government 
or just economic or politic pressure to change the policies.  
-The last weakness is the lack of co-ordination between local and national bodies and 
measures. It therefore lacks to provide the necessary resources to fight the shadow economy as a 
whole
71
.  
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Conclusion 
 
The economy can be divided in two: the official economy and the unofficial economy. 
The unofficial economy (hidden economy) can then be divided in three: the irregular, criminal and 
informal. This already gives an idea of the importance of the hidden economy. As we have seen all 
along the project, the hidden economy is omnipresent; it can be in any sector, any companies, and 
any household.  
For the above mentioned reason, its measurements are very fastidious and the 
reliability of the results depends on the methods used. The methods are based on assumptions that 
are not entirely true. However it is the only illustration of the hidden economy available to us and if 
the methods are used consequently in all countries, the results should allow one to make some 
useful comparisons.  
When looking at the causes in general we also observe that they are numerous and 
depending on the countries, each more or less important. The main causes seem to be a lack of 
flexibility, density of regulations, tax and contribution burden and tax morality. 
Analyzing the size and nature of the hidden economy in Denmark has taught us which 
individuals were more involved in it, which factors influence the hidden economy the most in 
Denmark and provided us with an idea of its size and extent. If we were to conclude why the HE is 
the size that it is in Denmark, with the information available to us and that we have gathered, we 
would say that the HE in Denmark is relatively low, thanks to a highly efficient administration 
system with a corruption level almost non-existent, all that combined with a fairly high trust in the 
government and institutions which provides a high level of tax morality, people are more willing to 
pay taxes because they see it as fair, they understand its necessity and enjoy the welfare system in 
which they live in. The percentage of the HE in Denmark is lower than countries like Spain, Greece, 
Italy, mainly for the aforementioned reasons. However, this welfare system does not come free and 
is financed by a relatively high fiscal burden (depending how one looks at it) and is the reason why 
the percentage of HE in Denmark is not lower that it supposedly is. A higher fiscal burden comes 
with more density of regulations which are both factors that have been seen to be main causes of an 
increase of the hidden economy. Regulations make it more complicated for someone to enter or stay 
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in the regular/official economy and a high tax burden can be contributing to why people could be 
less willing to pay taxes and therefore looking for ways to evade taxes.  
Policies that can influence the hidden economy are divided in two: the exit options 
and voice options. The examples of policies we have given are all part of the exit option. Policies 
given in the example section were about preventing, punishing or encouraging companies to come 
back/enter the official economy. Denmark should analyze what the main causes for its hidden 
economy are and elaborate policies targeted directly or indirectly at those causes. They should look 
at what other countries have done and the extent of the success of those policies. After that, they 
would be able to design policies that are appropriate for the Danish economy and fit with the 
current economic trend.   
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Afterthoughts 
 
We found this topic very interesting and were filled with lots of ideas from the 
beginning. One of the main worries was how we were going to find first-hand, empirical data in 
order to bring something new to the subject and not only analyze books and reports from other 
authors. The initial plan was to do interviews, and then came the question, interviews of whom? We 
then find out about the Rockwool Foundation which deals with, among other things, the hidden 
economy in Denmark and we therefore thought that their knowledge could teach us a lot. It turns 
out that they were apparently all very busy in this period and did not have time to accord us an 
interview.  
One of the first interests for the project was to gain knowledge about the size of the 
criminal economy in the actual economy. We could then have discussed whether legalizing, for 
example, certain drugs would benefit Denmark or other countries (economically). We therefore 
immediately thought about Holland and tried to find out how big the difference between the HE in 
Denmark and Holland was. It then turned out that there are very few data about the criminal 
economy plus, the difference between the HE in Denmark and Holland was not significant enough 
to conclude anything.  
The complexity and obvious lack of information about the subject made it difficult to 
draw a conclusion or theory based on the data we possess. Some causes and indicators can be 
proved by numbers but it is not sure how they interact with the HE and their importance. If a 
conclusion has to be drawn about the hidden economy in Denmark for example it will be based on 
numbers, partially, and then what we know about the system but there is also an empirical aspect, 
what we, ourselves in the group, have observed in our lives. One of us, having lived in another 
country (France), can observe the difference between the systems in the two countries and can 
realize the difference between for example tax morality and the efficiency of the administration. 
People that have lived in Denmark most of their lives can also see those difference if they are made 
aware about it. Those empirical observation enable us to talk about the tax morality in Denmark and 
the trust of the citizens in the government, however it is something that we are not able to prove 
right now.  
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Appendix 
 
The Swiss Example 
The hidden economy in Switzerland is according to Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider very 
low compared to other Western economies. Dr. Friedrich Schneider states that the Swiss hidden 
economy is on 8,3 % (calculation based on % of the “official” GDP) that is the second lowest with 
only USA having a lower percentages, comparing other countries in Europe Belgium is with 17,8 % 
and Denmark 14,3 %  (2009, using the model approach)
72
. These numbers seems to have grown all 
over Europe due to the economic crises and especially in the Southern part of Europe, “In the years 
of economic expansion were many young people who left school to found jobs easily.” 73.  
Unemployment rates of under 1 % has been normal for Switzerland for long periods, the tough 
times in the beginning of the 1990‟ies made the unemployment rose explosively to 5,7 % in January 
1997. The Swiss authorities have been good at taking foreigners in when the economy has been 
booming and sending them home when times have been tough economically. The upturn in the end 
of the 90‟ies until 2001 had a good impact on the unemployment rate and sent it down on 1,7 % 
since then there have been a little tougher times for the economy of the world and therefore also the 
Swiss economy it now means that the unemployment rate has raised to 3,4 % in March 2011
74
. 
Switzerland is an attractive country to place a company headquarter since low corporate taxation 
makes the multinational business more competitive on the international scene, it is therefore not that 
difficult to understand that companies like the German Bayer and the French Cartier decided to 
move their HQs to the region. Switzerland‟s location in the middle of Europe is another advantage. 
The canton Zug is one of the cheapest cantons to operate in for a foreign company. The corporate 
taxation is around 14 – 17 %75, but there have been and will be cases where the canton is willing to 
negotiate a lower tax for a company if it is of big importance for the area in order to secure the jobs 
and the growth such a company potentially can create. The Swiss laws are allowing these kinds of 
                                                          
72 http://www.econ.jku.at/members/Schneider/files/publications/ShadowEconomy21OECD_2009.pdf 
73
 
http://www.barcelonareporter.com/index.php?/news/comments/spain_the_economic_crisis_has_affected_younger_
people_than_adults_unemploym/ 
74
 http://www.tradingeconomics.com/switzerland/unemployment-rate 
75
 http://www.lowtax.net/lowtax/html/jswdctx.html 
54 
 
“buying” foreign companies, and that is one of the reasons why the capital of Zug, Zug has become 
one of the richest towns in the country, with its almost 25000 inhabitants it is a small town but this 
way of dealing has made the area grow year after year, since the new companies gives the already 
established real estates, supermarkets, lawyers, universities and car dealerships etc more work to do 
and therefore more money. That is the reason why the canton and the country are allowing the 
multinational companies these attractive conditions because it is creating jobs and wealth in the 
region. Another OECD member like Denmark charges 25 %
76
 in corporate taxation so compared to 
14 % or lower there are a big difference and when talking about companies like Bayer a big of 
money to save. The European Union has for years made a big effort to stop these favorable 
regulations, because jobs are moving from as an example Germany to Switzerland, the fact that 
Switzerland is a non member of the European Union has made this dilemma hard to agree on. 
Switzerland has made regulations that have made it easier for EU citizens to go the country to work 
and live, what EU requests is just that Switzerland is making their favorable taxation a little less 
favorable in order to make EU more attractive for the jobs that currently are placed in Switzerland. 
The canton of Zug and the Swiss government has responded in a negative matter saying. 
“Zug denied that its corporate tax regime breaches a 1972 Free Trade Agreement between 
Switzerland and the European Union. Guido Jud, head of corporate tax in canton Zug, said that he 
was "surprised" by the EU's viewpoint. 
"The rules on taxation in Switzerland have not changed recently so we do not see why, in 2005, 
there should be suddenly be a problem," he stated”77 
“The federal government has played down the affair, saying the letter was merely a request for 
information rather than a formal complaint against the tax regime
78”. 
With about 30% foreigners in some canton they are doing something right, the country is a safe 
place to be in, the kids have the possibility to go to one of the high skilled international schools and 
cities like Bern and Zurich offers many different things to do like cultural and sports
79
. 
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The retirement age in Switzerland is for men 65 and 64 for women, compared to its neighbors Italy 
where men retire at 57-65 and women at 60 the Swiss numbers look good there 
80
, but when 
comparing with its northern neighbor Germany that already raised the retirement age from 65 to 67 
81
, they are behind. 
“Today a gap still exists between the north and south of Europe. In general, northern 
Europe is more committed to labour market reforms than the south, which is more passive. 
Meanwhile, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is doing its bit 
in an attempt to raise the retirement age. In a report entitled Employment Outlooks, the Paris group 
recommended that governments should redouble their efforts to improve the employment outlook 
for various collectives, including women and the elderly, disabled and unskilled workers. The 
report, published in September of 2006, predicts many OECD member countries will suffer slower 
growth as their population ages, unless measures are taken
82”. 
The Swiss people are aware of this ticking bomb and there already been made a big survey where 
70 per cent of 804 firms were expecting to retain older workers, having in mind that the workforce 
over the age of 50 is expected to rise from a quarter to a third by 2020. 
The findings were revealed at a conference in Zurich, co-hosted by economic think tank Avenir 
Suisse and Zurich Cantonal Bank. 
 
George Sheldon, a professor at Basel University, contributed to the study on older people in the 
Swiss workforce. He says part of the problem is the emphasis on young people. 
 
"A large number of older people have simply been overlooked in the drive to get the younger 
generation into work," Sheldon told swissinfo. 
 
Some of the above positive stories about Switzerland might also be a cause of the way Switzerland 
is ruled on the Swiss population has in many matters more to say than other people elsewhere in the 
western part of the world. Many of the member states of the European Union are only having voting 
                                                          
80
 
https://www.aarpglobalnetwork.org/netzine/TrendWatch/europe/Pages/Italytoequalizeretirementageforbothsexesb
y2018.aspx 
81
 http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,2379004,00.html 
82
 http://focus.ie.edu/entry.php?id=1264 
56 
 
for the public when it is time for electing the government, other big solutions like accepting new EU 
treaties are to be taken care of the politicians and not the public. Switzerland is also a country with 
politicians like everywhere but the thing that differs here is that the population have much more 
power – Switzerland is one if the only countries that perform some of its politics in the old Athenian 
way. Some could argue that the Swiss population has more ownership of the different laws and 
regulations and respects them more because they in many matters have a saying. 
“At communal level, citizens also have the right to submit proposals to amend 
communal laws and oppose certain decisions taken by the executive. The extent of these rights 
varies depending on the canton and the commune” 83    
Switzerland is very decentralized when it comes to politics and in this way the people of 
Switzerland will receive information faster than in another system like the German that is an 
example of the indirect or representative democracy, where ideas and proposals for making new 
laws have a longer way to the German man and woman compared to Switzerland where the people 
in many matters are a part of the decision making and therefore get the right details in time to make 
the right call.  
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